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Oil and Gas Law: Hull v. Sun Refining and
Marketing Company: Are Division Orders a
Condition Precedent to Payment or Merely an
Oppressive Condition?
L Introduction
Although there are several definitions for the term "division order,"'
generally a division order is defined as a revocable authorization to the
purchaser of oil and gas production (purchaser) for payment upon a stated
basis to the owners of production. 2 It is revocable at the will of either
party, but both are bound until the division order is terminated.3 Essentially,
the instrument declares that portion of production to which each royalty
interest owner is entitled. In addition, the instrument contains provisions
relating to the computation of price, sellers' warranties, notice of change
of ownership, and other similar relevant provisions.
4
The purchaser, in order to protect itself, usually requires that all interest
holders execute a division order.' Such an act is necessary because when
produced, oil and gas become the personal property of those persons holding
an interest in the mineral estate.6 Therefore, to avoid liability for conversion,
the purchaser has the obligation to determine the ownership of the personalty
which he is receiving for his own use and to secure the agreement of the
owners.
7
While no authoritative source reveals the origin of the division order, it
is often presented as though it was of divine origins or appeared on the
scene "full grown like Athena from the head of Zeus." 9 Whatever the
origin, the division order first appeared on the judicial scene in 1899.10
Although it has undergone some changes through the years, the division
1. See generally 2 E. BRowN, LAW oF O. AND GAs LEAsES § 16.02(4)(D)(a) (2d ed. 1973);
4 H. WV=ms & C. Mxns, On. AND GAS LAw § 701 (1981); Bounds, Division Orders, 5
INST. oN Om & GAs L. & TAx'N 91 (1954).
2. R. HEMNGWAY, THE LAw op Om AND GA § 7.5, at 336, 362 (2d ed. 1983).
3. Id. § 7.5, at 363.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Gregg, Title Examination and Division Orders, 19 INsT. o N On. & GAs L. & TAX'N
29, 30 (1968).
7. Id.
8. Hooper & Schieier, Current Use and Effect of Division Orders, 19 S. Tnx. L.J. 531,
532 (1977).
9. Rain, A Further Look at Division Orders & Problems in Accounting and Payment of
Proceeds of Oil and Gas, 8 Rocky MTN. MiN. L. IN sT. 69,70 (1960).
10. Childers v. Neely, 47 W. Va. 70, 34 S.E. 828 (1899). Childers was filed as a bill in
equity for dissolution of a partnership and for ai accounting of all accounts including proceeds
on oil sold by the partners by separate division orders.
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order is, nevertheless, basically the same today as it was at the time of its
origin." Despite the industry's long-standing familiarity with the division
order, certain issues pertaining to its. use remain undecided. Whether a
royalty interest owner is required to execute a division order as a condition
precedent to payment of royalty proceeds is one such issue.
12
This note will examine the law in Oklahoma as it pertains to the division
order, focusing on the recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Hull v.
Sun Refining & Marketing Co.'3 The note will also provide a review of the
analysis employed by the Hull court. Finally, this note will discuss future
implications for the oil and gas industry arising from Hull.
II. Background
A. Common L(,.w
Prior to Hull, the common law was clear and unambiguous concerning
the execution of a division order. In Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co.
v. Kilhingsworth"4 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that at common
law, a recognized custom and usage of th6 oil and gas industry required
that all royalty holders must execute a division order before receiving royalty
payments.' 5 Similarly, in Wolfe v. Texas Co.' 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, interpreting Oklahoma trade usage, held that
purchasers of oil and gas have the right to withhold payment of royalty
proceeds, until furnished with an abstract showing marketable title and a
division order executed by the lessor.
B. Legislative Enatment
In 1985, the Oklahoma legislature enacted title 52, section 540,' 7 which
was intended to expressly govern the payment of royalties from oil and gas
11. Bounds, supra ncte 1, at 92.
12. See Holliman, Division Orders - A Primer, 34 Om & GAs INST. 313, 332 (1983).
13. 789 P.2d 1272 (Okla. 1989).
14. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Killingsworth, 175 Okla. 78, 51 P.2d 505
(1935) (assignee of an oil and gas lease failed to notify the buyer of a change in the ownership
of the lease, thereby caucing that buyer to continue to pay the royalty owner as designated in
a previous division order, was held liable to the buyers of the royalty interests; this was so
notwithstanding the contention that the buyers of the royalty interest knew that the purchaser
of the oil was paying another for their interests, and that by custom royalty oil was never
paid for until division orders were properly executed by owners and furnished to the buyer).
15. Id.
16. 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936); see also Wolfe v, Shell
Petroleum Corp., 83 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936); Wolfe v. Prairie
Oil & Gas Co., 83 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1936).
17. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 540 (Supp. 1985). The section provides:
A. The proceeds derived from the sale of oil or gas production from any oil
or gas well shall be paid to persons legally entitled thereto, commencing no later
than six (6) month: after the date of first sale, and thereafter no later than sixty
(60) days after the end of the calendar month within which subsequent production
is sold. Such layment is to be made to persons entitled thereto by the first




units.' However, curiously absent from section 540 was any mention of
division orders. That omission created uncertainty as to whether the legis-
lature intended the statute to be interpreted as abrogating the common law
requirement to execute a division order.
C. Recent Case Law
Seemingly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma leaned toward an interpre-
tation of section 540 requiring the execution of a division order in Teel v.
Public Service Co.19 In dictum, the Teel0 court stated that a division order
consists of an agreement between the working interest owners and the
purchasers which provides a payment formula for gas.2' Its function is to
protect the purchaser from liability.? Nonetheless, a purchaser is not pro-
tected unless the working interest owners sign a division order.2 Accordingly,
persons entitled to such proceeds from production semiannually for the aggregate
of six (6) months' accumulations of monthly proceeds of amounts less than
Fifteen Dollars ($15.00). Further provided, that any delay in determining the
persons legally entitled to an interest in such proceeds from production caused
by unmarketable title to such interest shall not affect payments to persons whose
title is marketable. Provided however, that in those instances where such proceeds
cannot be paid because the title thereto is hot marketable, the purchasers of such
production shall cause all proceeds due such interest to earn interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum, until such time as the title to such interest has
been perfected. Marketability of title shall be determined in accordance with the
then current title examination standards of the Oklahoma Bar Association. The
first purchaser shall be exempt from the provisions of this subsection and the
owner of the right to drill and to produce under an oil and gas lease or force
pooling order shall be substituted for the first purchaser therein where the owner
and purchaser have entered into arrangements where the proceeds are paid by
the purchaser to the owner who assumes the responsibility of paying the proceeds
to persons legally entitled thereto.
B. Any said first purchasers or owner of the right to drill and produce
substituted for the first purchaser as provided herein that violates this act shall
be liable to the persons legally entitled to the proceeds from production for the
unpaid amount of such proceeds with interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, calculated from date of first sale.
C. The district court for the county in which the oil or gas well is located
shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings brought pursuant to this act. The
prevailing party in any proceeding brought pursuant to this act shall be entitled
to recover any court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
Id.
18. Seal v. Corporation Comm'n, 725 P.2d 278, 294 (Okla. 1986), appeal dismissed, 479
U.S. 1073 (1987).
19. 767 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1985) (section 540 was not directly applicable to Teel because the
statute, prospective in nature, was enacted after the suit was filed).
20. Id. (an owner of a working interest in a gas well brought an action for accounting
and termination of leasehold rights against the operators of gas well and the purchasers of
the gas).
21. Id. at 397.
22. Id.; see Bounds, supra note 1, at 92.
23. Id.
19911
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the court recognized that in the absence of an executed division order, the
purchaser could be found to have converted the production.2
Ill. Hull v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co.
In Hull v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co.,25 Robert Hull executed a
mineral lease to Five Star Oil & Gas Company. Unquestionably, Hull had
marketable title to all the oil, gas, and other minerals. That lease was
subsequently assigned to Bill Andress, the lessee and operator at the time
the well was drilled and completed. Andress, acting as agent for Hull,
negotiated an oil purchase contract with Sun Refining and Marketing Com-
pany (Sun).
Sun was the first purchaser responsible for royalty payments to Hull.
Therefore, on the basis of a division order title opinion, Sun submitted its
standard division order to Hull for his signature. However, Hull refused to
sign. Consequently, Sun refused to make royalty payments to Hull.
In the resulting lawsuit,2 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma addressed the
issue of whether a lessor is bound by a contract provision, implied under
common law, requiring the execution of a division order as a condition
precedent to the payment of royalty proceeds.27 In a 5-4 opinion,28 the court
held that the only situation in section 540 that justifies suspension of royalty
payments is the existence of unmarketable title.29 Thus, the court concluded
that section 540 abrogated the common law.30
A. Legislative Intent to Establish Marketable
Title as the Standard for Payment
As previously staled, royalty payments in Oklahoma from an oil or gas
unit are expressly governed by section 540. 31 Accordingly, the Hull majority
initiated its opinion by establishing the standard for payment of royalty
24. Id.
25. Hull v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 789 P.2d 1272 (Okla. 1989).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1274; see also Legg & Murrah, Royalty Payments - Who Owes How Much to
Whom and When?, 35 lNsT. oN Om & GAs L. & TAX'N 159, 165 (1984) (stating that the cases
are somewhat ambiguous on whether a purchaser can insist upon a signed division order before
payment, but inferring that to depend upon requiring a division order is dangerous to the
purchaser). But see Holliman, supra note 12, at 333 (where the interest owner has not elected
to take his share of the production in kind, thereby designating the lessee as its marketing
agent, the purchaser may withhold payment of the share of the proceeds of production allocable
to the interest of the uncooperative owner without liability until the division order is signed).
28. The opinion contists of three parts. Justice Kauger wrote the majority opinion with
whom Chief Justice Hargrave and Justices Lavender, Doolin, and Wilson joined. Justice Simms
wrote the dissenting opinion with whom Vice Chief Justice Opala and Justice Hodges and
Summers joined.
29. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1274.
30. Id.





proceeds, as expressed in section 540. Subsection 540(A) specifically states
that royalty payments "shall be paid to persons legally entitled thereto.1
32
In the event that some of the interest holders' payments are suspended due
to questionable title, subsection 540(A) nevertheless provides that this delay
"shall not affect payments to persons whose title is marketable. ' 33
The court interpreted the language in subsection 540(A) as indicating the
legislature's intent to establish marketable title as the standard for payment
of royalty proceeds.3 4 By using marketable title as a standard for payment
under section 540, the legislature expressed its intent that suspension of
royalty payments is proper only when a legitimate question as to marketa-
bility of title exists. Furthermore, the marketable title standard specifically
creates guidelines, thereby avoiding needless litigation arising from sus-
pended payments.3 5 Therefore, to require the execution of a division order
as a condition precedent to payment would create a condition for payment
neither expressly nor impliedly imposed by the legislature.
3 6
B. Conflict Between Section 540 and the Common Law
Hull acknowledged that at common law, a recognized custom and usage
of the oil and gas industry included the requirement that royalty holders
execute a division order before receiving royalty payments.3 7 However,
statutes may abolish a common law right where the intention to do so is
plainly expressed.3 The court concluded that, although section 540 did not.
expressly state that the recognized common law custom and usage requiring
the execution of a division order had been abrogated, the text of section
540 is conclusive. Under section 540, the only condition justifying suspension
of royalty payments is a lack of marketable title. For that reason, the court
found that the common law rule conflicted with section 540. 39 When conflict
exists between a statute and a custom and usage, the statute controls
0
When a statute is enacted for the purpose of preventing an act, e.g., the
needless suspension of royalty proceeds, no custom can prevail over its
provisions. 41 Thus, the court ruled that an interpretation that the common
law rule survived the enactment of section 540 would contravene the statute
in two ways..First, such an interpretation would contravene the statute's
express provision requiring payment to parties with marketable title. Second,
32. See supra note 17.
33. Id.
34. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1277.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1278 (citing Wolfe v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 83 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936)); Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 553 (1936); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Killingsworth, 175 Okla. 78, 51 P.2d
505, 506 (1935).
38. Id. at 1279 (citing Reaves v. Reaves, 15 Okla. 240, 82 P. 490, 495 (1905)).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Smith v. Cox, 301 P.2d 649, 651 (Okla. 1956)); see also Franklin v. Shelton,
250 F.2d 92, 96 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959 (1958).
41. Id.
1991]
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allowing common law custom and usage to survive would permit purchasers
to defeat the legislature's intent by withholding payment until lessors exe-
cuted an unaltered document containing provisions which might contravene
the lease and be unfavorable to the lessor.
42
Section 540 did not preclude negotiations between royalty owners and
purchasers for the signing of a division order. However, the court clearly
stated that purchasers may not, under the guise of custom and usage,
impose unfavorable conditions on royalty owners, using a threat of sus-
pended payment to coerce acquiescence. 41
C. Trade Usage Contrary to Public Policy
Both parties agreed that Andress acted as an agent for Hull in negotiating
the contract for the sale of oil. Nonetheless, the parties disagreed over
whether the custom and usage requiring the execution of a division order
was included in the oil purchase contract.
The Hull court acknowledged that agents may contract and bind their
principals to trade customs and usages. 44 However, the court specifically
stated that such power does not extend to customs and usages which are
either illegal or contrary to public policy. 4 The requirement that a lessor
execute a division order before receiving royalty payments conflicts with the
spirit and letter of section 540.46 Therefore, it is violative of the public
policy intended by the enactment of section 540-prompt payment to royalty
owners of proceeds from the sale of oil or gas. 47 Consequently, the court
found that the custom was not included 'in the oil purchase contract. 41
D. Methodology Incorrect
Justice Simms, Vice-Chief Justice Opala, and Justices Hodges and Sum-
mers dissented from the entire opinion, urging the majority to re-examine
its interpretation of the legislative intent expressed in section 540.49 The
dissent concluded that section 540 did not plainly, or otherwise, express any
intent to abolish the common law custom and usage requiring execution of
division orders.5 0
In addition, the dissent argued that the majority failed to justify the
conclusion that unfadr or unfavorable conditions might be imposed on the
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1280. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENcY § 34 (1957). The section
provides, in pertinent part: "[Ain authorization is interpreted in light of all accompanying
circumstances, including among other matters ... (B) the general usages of business, the
usages of trades or employments of the kind to which the authorization relates, and business
methods of the principle." Id.









royalty owner under the guise of custom and usage.' Therefore, the dissent
asserted that a correct interpretation of section. 540 would necessarily involve
upholding the common law requirement to execute a division order as a
condition precedent to royalty payment. 52
IV. Inconsistencies in the Hull Decision
The Hull decision is inconsistent with both common law and the legislative
intent of section 540. By holding that the custom and usage requiring the
execution of a division order did not survive the enactment of section 540,
the court created confusion in a well-settled area of law.
A. Common Law Requirement Remains in Full Force and Effect
Except as altered by constitution and statutes, the common law remains
in full force and effect.53 Accordingly, statutes may abolish a common law
right where the intention to do so is plainly expressed.
5 4
By the court's own admission, section 540 did not plainly, or otherwise,
express an intent to abolish the common law requirement to execute a
division order.5 In light of this admission, it is beyond question that the
court should have held that section 540 should be construed in a manner
consistent with the existing common law.56 Instead, the majority erroneously
advocated that the only prerequisite for payment is marketable title.
B. Statutory Language Contemplates More Than Mere
Marketable Title as the Standard for Payment of Royalty Proceeds
Hull based its interpretation of section 540 primarily on the legislature's
use of the term "shall. '57 Unquestionably, the term "shall" indicates a
legislative mandate requiring interpretation.58 The court, however, misinter-
preted what "shall" references.5 9
The statute's first reference to the term "shall" is that proceeds from
production "shall be paid to persons legally entitled thereto, commencing
51. Id. at 1281.
52. Id.
53. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (1981). Section 2 provides:
The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial
decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in
and of the general statutes of Oklahoma; but the rule of the common law, that
statutes in derogation thereof, shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable
to any general statute of Oklahoma; but all such statutes shall be liberally
construed to promote their object.
Id.
54. See supra note 38.
55. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1279.
56. Id. at 1281.
57. Id. at 1277.
58. Id.; see Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 743 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Okla. 1987) ("shall" connotes
mandatory duty when it is used in statute); TIP Corp. v. Edmondson, 630 P.2d 1296, 1297
(Okla. 1981) (word "shall" contained in statute connotes a mandatory duty).
59. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1277.
1991]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
no later than sbc months after the date of first sale."' 6 While this phrase
does mandate payment, it does not mandate payment to royalty owners on
the basis of marketable title alone. 6' Rather, the phrase indicates the legis-
lature's intent that royalty proceeds be paid to persons "legally entitled
thereto," 62 which contemplates more than mere marketable title.63
The statute's second reference to the term "shall" states "that any delay
in determining the persons legally entitled to an interest in such proceeds
from production caused by unmarketable title to such interest shall not
affect payments to persons whose title is marketable.' '64 Again, this provision
does not require payment on the basis of marketable title alone. The
provision was included in the statute merely to prevent the purchaser from
suspending payment to all royalty owners simply because one owner's title
is in dispute.
65
While it is certainly true that a purchaser may withhold proceeds when
title is not marketable,6 demonstration of marketable title alone is not
sufficient in and of itself to make an owner legally entitled to receive
payment.67 Accordingly, causes other than unmarketable title may exist
which make an owner not legally entitled to receive payment. 68 Failure to
execute a division order is one such cause under section 540 which must be
met before a royalty owner would be legally entitled to be paid from
proceeds. 69 Therefore, the court's interpretation that the term "shall" re-
quired payment upon demonstration of marketable title alone70 is unfounded.
C. Subsequent Legislation as a Guide to Determine
the Legislative Intent of Section 540
When construing prior legislative enactments, subsequent legislation upon
the same subject may be used to interpret the prior enactment. 7' In addition,
different legislative enactments pertaining to the same subject should be
construed together as a harmonious whole.72 To determine the true legislative
intent of section 54-0, the court should have examined title 52, section 540
of the Oklahoma Statutes (the 1989 amendment). 73 The 1989 amendment
explicitly provides for the execution of a division order as a prerequisite
60. See supra note 17.
61. Hull, 789 P.2d rt 1277.
62. See supra note 17.
63. See Appellant's Brief in Support o'f Petition for Rehearing at 11, Hull (No. 71179).
64. See supra note 17.
65. See Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 11, Hull (No. 71179).
66. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1277.
67. Id. at 1281 (Simi, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1277.
71. Letteer v. Conservancy Dist. No. 30, 385 P.2d 769 (Okla. 1963).
72. Id.




for payment to royalty owners on and after the effective date of July 1,
1989.74 Section 540(B) of the 1989 amendment75 provides in pertinent part:
"A division order is an instrument for the purpose of directing the distri-
bution of proceeds from the sale of oil.... A division order is executed
to enable the purchaser of the production from the leasehold to make
remittance directly to the interest owners for their royalty interest .... "176
Interpreting section 540 in view of the 1989 amendment, the court should
have construed its language in a manner consistent with the existing common
law requirement to execute a division order.77
D. Comparison of Section 540 with Other
States' Division Order Statutes
In support of its interpretation of section 540, Hull noted that
commentators" emphasizing the importance of division orders to the oil
and gas industry recognize that statutes similar to section 540 may require
payment in the absence of an executed division order.7 9 While this is true,
the issue is not whether the legislature has the power to require payment
without division orders, but whether section 540 was intended to accomplish
that result. s0 A review of similar statutes adopted by other states demon-
strates the intent to compensate owners for delays in receiving royalty
proceeds by requiring the payment of interest, and not to eliminate the use
of division orders.8 ' When a state intends to eliminate the requirement to
execute division orders, that intent is clearly stated.
8 2
Several states have enacted statutes similar to section 540 requiring a
purchaser to pay royalty proceeds to persons "legally entitled thereto." 83
74. Id.
75. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 540(B) (Supp. 1989). Subsection 540(B) was not directly applicable
in Hull because the subsection only applied to division orders executed on or after July 1,
1989.
76. Id. § 540.
77. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1281.
78. See Legg & Murrah, supra note 27; Holliman, supra note 12, at 332 (while courts have
approved the practice of using division orders and have recognized their usefulness, it appears
that a party entitled to share in the proceeds from the sale of production cannot be required
to sign a division order); Twenhafel, Oil-Gas Division Orders: Their Origin, Varieties and
Usage, 27 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. IN sT. 1479 (1982).
79. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1278.
80. See Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 11, Hull (No. 71179).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See ALA. CODE § 9-17-33 (Supp. 1982) ("The proceeds ... shall be paid to persons
legally entitled thereto ... such payment is to be made to persons legally entitled thereto be
the first purchasers of such production."); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-10-1 to -5 (Supp. 1987)
("The oil and gas proceeds ... shall be paid to all persons legally entitled to such pay-
ments . . . ."); TEx. CODE ANN. NAT. REs. §§ 91.401-.405 (Vernon 1988) ("Payee means any
person or persons legally entitled to payment from the proceeds derived from the sale of
oil .... "); UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1989) ("The oil and gas proceeds . . . shall be
paid to all persons legally entitled to these payments . . ").
1991]
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Like section 540, the statutes place no specific restrictions on the use of
division orders.84 Rather, the statutes impliedly recognize that causes other
than unmarketable title may exist under which an owner may not be legally
entitled to payment.Ys
New Mexico86 and Utah87 have even gone so far as to enact statutes
specifying other factors which, if present, prevent a person from being
legally entitled to payment. 8 Among the reasons included in those statutes
is failure to execute a division order.89
In direct contrast to those statutes designed to define the time when
payment should be made and to provide interest for delays are those statutes
intended to eliminate the use of division orders. 90 When division orders are
intended to be eliminated by statute, that intent is clearly expressed by the
legislature. 91 North Dakota's statute specifically states: "[R]oyalty payments
may not be withheld because an interest owner has not executed a division
order."9
E. Common Law Requirement Does Not Violate Public Policy
In Hull, the court found that requiring a lessor to execute a division
order before receiving royalty payments conflicts with the spirit and letter
of section 540 and is violative of the public policy93 intended by its enact-
merit.94 However, as stated, the majority failed to mention just what unfair
or unfavorable conditions were imposed upon the royalty owner under the
guise of custom and usage which would justify such a decision." Neither
the majority opinion nor the record" shows terms in the division order
prepared by Sun which were unfair or oppressive." Therefore, the court's
84. See Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 11, Hull (No. 71179).
85. Id. at 12.
86. N.M. STAT. ANr. § 70-10-5 (Supp. 1982).
87. UTAH CODE ANr. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1989).
88. See Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 12, Hull (No. 71179).
89. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-10-5 (Supp. 1987) ("The penalty provisions of the Oil and
Gas proceeds payment Act [70-10-1 to 5] shall not apply in the following instances ... [Tihe
party entitled to payment has failed to execute the payor's customary and reasonable division
order .... "); UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1989) ("The penalty provisions of this chapter
do not apply in the following instances: ... The party entitled to payment has failed or
refused to execute a division order .... ).
90. See Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 12, Hull (No. 71179).
91. Id. at 13.
92. N.D. CENT. CorE § 47-16-39.3 (Supp. 1987).
93. In Hull, the court stated that the public policy intended to be promoted was prompt
payment to royalty owners of proceeds from the sale of oil or gas.
94. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1280.
95. Id. at 1282.
96. Sun's standard cdivision order set forth the proportionate share of royalty each lessor
was entitled to receive, the respective tax identification numbers and nine other covenants
which covered: (1) the quality of the oil and how it will be measured; (2) commingling; (3)
warranty of title; (4) oil sales; (5) passage of title; (6) change of interest; (7) tax deductions;
(8) production standards; and (9) effective date of division order.
97. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1282.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss3/9
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assertion that the common law usage requiring the execution of a division
order is violative of public policy is wholly unsupportable.98
V. Conflict and Confusion in the Oil and Gas Industry
Resulting from the Court's Decision
The importance of a division order is readily apparent. It establishes the
legal relationship between the owners of the oil and the purchasing company,
and is generally the first and only written relationship between the two
parties. 99 Consequently, without an executed division order, it is uncertain
whether a purchaser has the authority to take the production. 14 That
uncertainty is further evidence that the court's interpretation of section 540
is incorrect, as its decision will only create conflict and confusion in the oil
and gas industry.10 ' However, to fully appreciate the liability and burden
the court's decision has placed on oil and gas purchasers, one must examine
the specific customary provisions of a division order that afford protection
and guidance to oil and gas purchasers.
A. Provision of a Division Order: Warranty
One of the first provisions of the division order is usually the warranty
clause. The signatory warrants or certifies that he owns a specific interest
in the minerals produced from the described premises. 0 2 The clause is
designed to protect the purchaser against improper payment in two specific
situations: (1) where the seller does not actually have an interest in the
minerals; and (2) where the size of his ownership interest is less than that
described in the division order.103
In the absence of a warranty of title, a purchaser who is held liable in
tort for conversion to the true owner would have no means of recouping
its loss.1°4 However, if the distribution of the proceeds is made in accordance
with the terms of a division order, the warranty clause will provide the
purchaser with an action for breach of warranty against the recipient of
the funds. The remedy is limited to the extent that the purchaser is held
liable in damages to the rightful owner of production. 0 5 The warranty
affords the purchaser with some measure of protection.
B. Provision of a Division Order: Change of Ownership
Mineral interests are freely alienable.1°6 Therefore, without some form of
protection, the transfer of a royalty or working interest could generate
98. Id.
99. Bounds, supra note 1, at 91.
100. Teel, 767 P.2d at 397.
101. See Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 14, Hull (No. 71179).
102. Holliman, supra note 12, at 318; see also Hooper, supra note 8, at 531.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See H. WiujAm & C. MEYERs, supra note 1, § 704.1.
106. Holliman, supra note 12, at 331.
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liability for a purchaser of production. Liability arises if, after the transfer
has been consurnmated, the purchaser erroneously continues to pay the
transferor. °7 Certainly this would be the case if the purchaser had actual
notice of the transfer.1'8 Some authority exists for such a result even if the
notice is merely constructive rather than actual.' °9
Notice problems associated with transfers make it desirable for a purchaser
to include an express provision in its division orders relieving it of respon-
sibility for payments made in compliance with the division order."0 This
express provision is applicable unless the purchaser has received prior written
notice of the change in ownership."' Accordingly, this provision eliminates
the application of any constructive notice rule. It also protects the purchaser
from liability for payments made to the transferor before receipt of written
notice of the change in ownership."
2
C. Provision oj' a Division Order: Pricing
A division order's most important provision sets the price to be paid for
the production." 3 While the pricing provision of an oil division order is
quite simple," 4 the pricing provision found in a gas division order is much
more complex. '"' In either case, without an executed division order, the
purchaser will not have any agreement between itself and the royalty owner
as to the price to be paid for royalty oil and gas.
' 6
The complexities associated with valuing gas for revenue distribution
purposes arise in the first instance from the language employed in typical
lease royalty clauses to describe the lessee's royalty payment obligation."
7
107. Id.
108. Id. This follows from the premise that oil and gas when produced become the personal
property of those owning the substance and the purchaser, in order to avoid liability for
conversion, must determine the ownership of the personalty he is receiving and secure the
agreement of the owners to its purchase. H. WLL AM & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 704.9
(1962).
109. See Shell Petrokum Corp. v. Royalty Petroleum Corp., III S.W.2d 1178 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 135 Tex. 12, 137 S.W.2d 753 (1940) (recording a
change in mineral interest ownership is sufficient notice to the purchaser of such transfer in
the absence of more stringent contractual requirements)
110. Holliman, supra note 12, at 331.
111. Id.
112. See Bounds, .upra note 1.
113. Hooper & Schleier, supra note 8, at 542.
114. Accounting to the payee under an oil division order usually is made on the basis of
the posted price for the grade and gravity of crude oil involved as applicable to the particular
field of production. Holliman, supra note 12, at 327. The term "posted price," as used in
this context, refers to a written statement of crude oil prices circulated publicly among buyers
and sellers of crude oil in a particular field reflecting the price per barrel that a crude oil
purchaser will pay for a specified quality crude produced from that field. H. Vn.MLLA s & C.
Mnmis, OiL & GAS LAW MANUAL OF TERms 557-58 (1969).
115. Holliman, supra note 12, at 327.
116. Hooper, supra note 8, at 546.
117. Holliman, supra note 12, at 546.
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That complexity is further compounded by the marketing alternatives atten-
dant to the disposition of gas.""
Royalty clauses often describe the royalty obligation with respect to gas
as being the duty to pay the "market value at the well" of a fractional
part of the production." 9 Thus, in the absence of some contrary directive,
a distribution of revenue pursuant to a division order would first require
the determination of the market value of the gas allocable to the interest
of each division order signatory. 120 Because the lease usually does not provide
a specific definition of the term "market value," parties to division orders
have become accustomed to using the division order provisions to express
how the market value of the gas will be determined.' 2' Most modern gas
division orders provide that settlement as to gas which is sold shall be made
on the basis of the net proceeds' " realized at the well from the sale of
gas.' 2' As a result, purchasers and lessors alike have a convenient method
for determining the market value of gas and the distribution of revenues
allocable to its sale.24
VI. Conclusion
At common law in Oklahoma, a recognized custom and usage of the oil
and gas industry requires a lessor to execute a division order as a condition
precedent to receipt of royalty payments. Except as altered by constitution
and statutes, the common law remains in full force and effect. A statute
may abolish a common law right, although its intention to do so must be
clearly expressed. In this regard, Hull recognized that section 540 did not
plainly, or otherwise, express any intent to abolish the common law. There-
fore, there should be no doubt that the custom and usage, requiring
execution of a division order, remains in full force and effect.
Furthermore, when construing prior legislative enactments, subsequent
legislation upon the same subject may be used to interpret the prior enact-
ment. The 1989 amendment to section 540 explicitly provides for the exe-
cution of a division order as a prerequisite for payment to royalty owners.
Accordingly, interpreting section 540 in vie* of the 1989 amendment, it is
obvious the legislature intended that section 540 be construed in a manner
consistent with the common law.
The Hull decision is inconsistent with both the common law and the
legislative intent in section 540. By asserting that section 540 abrogated the
long-standing custom and usage in the oil and gas industry requiring the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 328.
121. Id.
122. Net proceeds is defined within the clause to mean the price received for the gas less
the cost of compressing, treating, dehydrating, and transporting the gas or otherwise placing
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execution of a division order, Hull has brought conflict and confusion to
a well-settled area of law.
Michael P. Royal
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